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Abstract 
This paper discusses why a “corporate governance movement” that commenced in the United 
States in the 1970s became an entrenched feature of American capitalism and describes how 
the chronology differed in a potentially crucial way for banks.  The paper explains corporate 
governance’s emergence and staying power by reference to changing market conditions and a 
deregulation trend that provided executives with unprecedented managerial discretion as the 
20
th
 century drew to a close.  With banking the historical pattern paralleled general trends in 
large measure.  Still, while the “imperial” CEO who achieved prominence in the 1980s 
became outmoded for the most part after corporate scandals at the start of the 2000s, this was 
not the case with large financial companies.  The continued boldness of “star” CEOs in the 
financial services industry plausibly contributed to the market turmoil of 2008 but the 
financial crisis emphatically ended the corporate governance “free pass” banks had enjoyed.       
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INTRODUCTION 
It has been well known since at least the 1932 publication of Adolf Berle and 
Gardiner Means’ The Modern Corporation and Private Property that shareholder passivity 
creates latitude for top executives of U.S. public companies to impose what are now 
commonly referred to as agency costs on investors.
1
  Nevertheless, it was only in the 1970s 
that debates in the United States about managerial accountability, board structure and 
shareholder rights began to be explicitly channelled through the term “corporate 
governance”.2  The change went well beyond mere terminology as a “corporate governance 
movement” quickly emerged.3  This would ultimately evolve into a “corporate governance 
complex” composed of a dense array of public institutions, private firms and academic 
centers dedicated to the pursuit of “better” corporate governance.4  
The basic chronology of corporate governance’s arrival and subsequent development 
has been traced elsewhere.
5
  Still, while there has been analysis of what happened when, a 
topic which has been gone largely unexplored is why the corporate governance movement 
gained momentum in the U.S. when it did and then endured through ensuing decades.  If it 
was well-known at least as far back as the 1930s that managerial accountability was 
                                                          
1
  ADOLF BERLE AND GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY (1932); the pioneering work on agency cost theory was Michael C. Jensen and 
William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:  Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).   
2
  Brian R. Cheffins, Introduction, THE HISTORY OF MODERN U.S. CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE ix, ix (Brian R. Cheffins, ed., 2011). 
3
  Daniel Fischel coined the term in the early 1980s:  Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate 
Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259 (1982). 
4
  Suzanne Stevens and Michael Rudnick, What Berle and Means Have Wrought, 
THEDEAL MAGAZINE, May 14, 2010, available online at 
http://www.shareholderforum.com/e-mtg/Library/20100514_Deal.htm (accessed Feb. 17, 
2014).  
5
  Cheffins, Introduction, supra note 2; Brian R. Cheffins, The History of Corporate 
Governance in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 46 (Mike Wright, 
Donald Siegel, Kevin Keasey and Igor Filatotchev, eds., 2013).  
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potentially lacking in publicly traded companies, why was the corporate governance 
movement postponed for nearly half a century?  And with corporate governance’s arrival 
being belated in the first place what caused interest in the topic to be sustained as the 20
th
 
century drew to a close and the 21
st
 century began?  Even though Ronald Gilson suggested as 
far back as 1996 that the next generation of corporate governance scholarship would be 
dynamic, examining how and why existing institutions responded to a changing array of 
problems,
6
 these important questions have gone largely unaddressed thus far.    
This paper offers conjectures on why the corporate governance movement gained 
momentum when it did and proved resilient thereafter, with the primary purpose in this 
particular context being to offer insights concerning the inter-relationship between the 
corporate governance of U.S. banks and the financial crisis.  A key point the paper makes is 
that a reconfiguration of the business environment affecting executives, directors and 
shareholders helps to explain the chronology of corporate governance’s arrival and its staying 
power.  As the 20
th
 century drew to a close, changing market conditions and a deregulation 
movement affecting a wide range of industries were providing executives with unprecedented 
discretion in relation to companies growing in size.  In this milieu, corporate governance 
could provide a salutary check on U.S. executives, thereby ensuring it would not be a mere 
1970s fad.   
Despite numerous lapses, such as various high-profile corporate scandals occurring in 
the early 2000s, a case can be made that in the U.S. standards of managerial accountability 
have now largely caught up with changes to the business environment.  Law professor Ed 
                                                          
6
  Ronald J. Gilson, Corporate Governance and Economic Efficiency: When Do 
Institutions Matter, 74 WASH. U.L.Q. 327, 345 (1996).  See also Stacey Kole and Kenneth 
Lehn, Deregulation, the Evolution of Corporate Governance Structure, and Survival, 87 
AMER. ECON. REV. 421, 425 (1997) (quoting Gilson, ibid. to the effect “how a system of 
governance moves from one equilibrium to the next may come to attract more interest than 
the characteristics of a particular equilibrium”). 
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Rock has posited, for instance, in a 2013 article that “the central problem of U.S. corporate 
law for the last eighty years--the separation of ownership and control--has largely been 
solved.”7  Perhaps, then, four decades after the corporate governance movement began a 
corporate governance equilibrium of sorts has been (re)established in corporate America.  
This paper argues that with banking the historical pattern parallels general trends in 
large measure but also varies from the basic narrative in an important way.  Due to a 
combination of deregulation, technological change and financial innovation banking was 
transformed between the 1970s and the mid-2000s from a “boring” business to a business that 
was anything but.  As part of this transformation senior bank executives had managerial 
latitude their mid-20
th
 century predecessors could have barely envisaged.   
Given the trends affecting banking, to the extent that corporate governance can and 
does provide a salutary check on executives operating with substantial latitude, a marked 
strengthening in the corporate governance in banks would have been anticipated.  There was 
movement in this direction.  Nevertheless, while non-financial companies were 
unmistakeably chastened by the corporate governance scandals of the early 2000s and by the 
corporate governance reforms introduced by the federal Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX)
8
 
during the mid-2000s the banking sector received something of a governance “free pass”.  In 
particular, high profile bank CEOs were able to continue to operate with discretion 
substantially withdrawn from newly subdued chief executives of non-financial companies.   
The additional managerial latitude which changing market conditions and 
deregulation afforded to top executives as the 20
th
 century drew to a close was exemplified by 
the emergence of “celebrity” or “imperial” CEOs who, it was widely believed, could 
                                                          
7
  Edward B. Rock, Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1907, 1909 (2013). 
8
  Pub.L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745. 
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transform corporate fortunes in a way their bureaucratic forerunners could not.  Generally 
speaking this conception of the chief executive officer (CEO) quickly became outmoded in 
the subdued post-Enron/Sarbanes-Oxley corporate governance environment.  During the mid-
2000s, however, “star” chief executives remained prevalent in large financial companies and 
their boldness arguably put their firms at risk as the financial crisis loomed and plausibly 
contributed to the market turmoil of 2008.   
The financial crisis proved to be something of a corporate governance equalizer for 
U.S. financial companies.  Banks are now being run less flamboyantly than was the case 
immediately prior to the onset of the crisis, much as non-financial companies operated in a 
more restrained way after the corporate scandals and legislative reforms of the early 2000s.  
However, unlike with changes affecting the non-financial companies of the early 2000s this 
occurred primarily because of pressure from regulators rather than as a result of market-
oriented corporate governance trends.  Ironically, though, corporate governance reforms in 
the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010,
9
 the primary federal legislative response to the financial crisis, 
potentially operate at cross-purposes to regulatory pressure on banks and their executives to 
be “boring”.   
I. THE HISTORY OF THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MOVEMENT – A PRÉCIS10  
In the decades immediately following World War II, amidst widespread corporate 
prosperity, senior executives of U.S. public companies for the most part fulfilled faithfully 
the responsibilities associated with their stewardship of corporate assets.  Correspondingly, 
while proposals had been made to foster managerial accountability that would be familiar to 
                                                          
9
  Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (hereinafter 
Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. L. 111-203. 
10
  What follows draws upon Cheffins, Introduction, supra note 2; Cheffins, History, 
supra note 5, xi-xxvii; Brian R. Cheffins, Did Corporate Governance “Fail” During the 
2008 Stock Market Meltdown?  The Case of the S&P 500, 65 BUS. LAWYER 1, 5-11 (2009).  
Footnotes supporting the propositions advanced here are available from these sources.   
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modern students of corporate governance – William Douglas argued as far back as 1934 in 
favor of statutory rules requiring a majority of board seats to be occupied by individuals not 
affiliated with management
11
 -- the internal governance of companies was not a high priority.  
Matters began to change in the 1970s, when the term corporate governance first came into 
vogue in the United States.  Executives and directors began to struggle to maintain control 
over sprawling corporate empires built in the 1950s and the 1960s, a trend the 1970 collapse 
of Penn Central, a large railway-based conglomerate, underscored.  Revelations shortly 
thereafter of bribery and illicit kickbacks involving dozens of U.S. public companies 
prompted fresh concerns, quite often couched in terms of corporate governance, about 
insufficient managerial accountability.   
When the phrase corporate governance first achieved prominence in the 1970s it 
seemingly connoted that the corporation was a political structure to be governed, a 
characterization that was out-of-step with the market-oriented zeitgeist of the 1980s and was 
at odds with the increasingly popular characterization of the corporation as a “nexus of 
contracts”.  Nevertheless, when in the late 1980s and early 1990s institutional investors 
demonstrated a growing willingness to engage in shareholder activism, initially to contest the 
adoption of anti-takeover devices by the companies in which they owned shares and later to 
pressure companies to increase the use of performance-oriented managerial compensation 
and to lobby for the relaxation of rules that created obstacles to shareholder intervention in 
corporate affairs, they often invoked the rhetoric of corporate governance in so doing.  With 
the phrase “corporate governance” becoming increasingly associated with the preservation 
and promotion of shareholder value academic economists, who were just beginning to turn 
                                                          
11
  William O. Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct, 47 HARV. L. REV. 1305, 1314-15 
(1934); see also ROBERT A. GORDON, BUSINESS LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE CORPORATION 
347-50 (1945).  
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their attention to the internal control systems of publicly held corporations, embraced the 
term and thereby enhanced its intellectual credibility.   
During the 1990s the promotion of shareholder rights and the fostering of boardroom 
accountability became topics of interest globally, rather than merely in the United States.  In 
the same way that “corporate governance” was the short-hand typically invoked to capture 
what was on the agenda in the United States, the term gained currency internationally.  As of 
1999 the corporate governance movement had progressed to the point where a Financial 
Times columnist observed that “The 1990s have been the decade of corporate governance.”12  
Correspondingly, when during the early 2000s scandals rocked major U.S. public companies 
such as Enron and WorldCom and when the financial crisis occurred in 2008 “corporate 
governance” would be the term that academics, policymakers, investors and corporate 
executives around the world deployed when analyzing issues relating to board structure, 
executive pay and shareholder involvement in publicly traded companies.
13
    
II. EXPLAINING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE’S ARRIVAL AND STAYING POWER  
A. A New Style of Corporate Leadership 
Why didn’t corporate governance end up as a 1970s fad in the same way as leisure 
suits, waterbeds, platform shoes and Pet Rocks?  Corporate governance’s staying power in 
the U.S. was due partly to changing patterns of share ownership.
14
  Between the 1960s and 
the 2000s pension funds, mutual funds and other institutional shareholders supplanted private 
                                                          
12
  Moves to Halt Another Decade of Excess, FIN. TIMES, August 5, 1999, 10. 
13
  A by-product was that “corporate governance” was referred to in newspaper reports 
and academic papers considerably more often after Enron than was the case in the 1990s – 
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen and Charles C.Y. Yang, Learning and the Disappearing 
Association Between Governance and Returns, 108 J. FIN. ECON. 323, 329-30 (2013).    
14
  On the points raised here, see Cheffins, Introduction, supra note 2, xix; Cheffins, 
History, supra note 5, 52-53; Bengt Holmstrom and Steven N. Kaplan, The State of U.S. 
Corporate Governance:  What’s Right and What’s Wrong?, 15(3) J. APP. CORP. FIN. 8, 11, 14 
(2005).   
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“retail” investors as the dominant owners of shares in publicly traded U.S. companies.  Due 
to pronounced collective action problems and a lack of relevant expertise private investors 
were ill-suited to step forward and keep executives of public companies in check.  
Institutional investors were by no means ideal shareholder activists.  They were, however, 
better resourced than retail investors.  They were also becoming more strongly motivated to 
take corrective action due to the increased prevalence of share ownership stakes large enough 
to preclude use of the “Wall Street Rule”, oriented around selling out of underperforming 
companies.  
The durability of the corporate governance movement was not merely a product, 
however, of shareholders who were better situated and more strongly motivated to intervene.  
A point thus far largely unacknowledged in the corporate governance literature is that 
dramatic changes affecting the manner in which U.S. public companies conducted business 
likely played a significant role.  As the 20
th
 century drew to a close senior executives were in 
charge of larger companies than their mid-20
th
 century predecessors and had greater 
managerial latitude, meaning that there was more at stake for investors than ever before.  The 
enhanced discretion executives had available to them could potentially be exercised in a 
manner prejudicial to the interests of shareholders.
15
  Improved corporate governance could 
in turn plausibly function as a beneficial corrective.  A logical corollary was that corporate 
governance had staying power 1970s fads lacked.   
C.K. Prahalad and Yves Doz captured an important part of what was going on in a 
2000 article on chief executive officers and wealth creation.  They remarked upon “a new 
                                                          
15
  Catherine M. Daily and Jonathan L. Johnson, Sources of CEO Power and Firm 
Financial Performance:  A Longitudinal Assessment, 23 J. MGMT. 97, 105 (1997) (“It may 
be…that CEOs possessing high levels of power misuse their power for their own benefit at 
the expense of shareholders.”)  
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style of corporate leadership – one that includes a public persona for the CEO.”16  They asked 
whether “a more visible corporate leadership reflect(ed) a new reality in the internal 
governance of large corporations?”17  Prahalad and Doz answered yes, saying that due to 
various key changes in the business environment “top management cannot take a ‘hands off’ 
approach or content themselves with effective stewardship of the assets they inherit at the 
beginning of their tenure.”18  They continued “The role of top management is no longer just 
control and coordination, it is anticipating, leading and managing change….”19 
Prahalad and Doz did not specify when executives focused merely on control and 
coordination but it would seem they had in mind the “managerial capitalism” prevalent 
during the 1950s and 1960s, characterized by Jeffrey Gordon as “the high-water mark of 
managerialism in U.S. corporate governance.”20  David Skeel has said of large corporations 
of this era “The qualities that were rewarded in most companies were dependability and 
loyalty, not creativity.  The most prominent CEOs were more likely to be corporate 
bureaucrats than entrepreneurial geniuses.”21  To the extent this characterization is accurate, 
given the economic prosperity the U.S. enjoyed during the decades immediately following 
World War II it is hardly surprising that corporate governance was not a high priority.   
                                                          
16
  C.K. Prahalad and Yves Doz, The CEO:  A Visible Hand in Wealth Creation?, 13(3) 
J. APP. CORP. FIN. 20, 20 (2000).    
17
  Ibid. 
18
  Ibid. 
19
  Ibid. 
20
  Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-
2005:  Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STANFORD L. REV. 1465, 1511 
(2007); see also GERALD F. DAVIS, MANAGED BY THE MARKETS:  HOW FINANCE RE-SHAPED 
AMERICA 63 (2009) (identifying the period from 1920 until the 1980s as the era of managerial 
capitalism, with the 1950s being when the managerial “soulful” corporation came to 
dominance). 
21
  DAVID SKEEL, ICARUS IN THE BOARDROOM:  THE FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS IN 
CORPORATE AMERICA AND WHERE THEY CAME FROM 108 (2005). 
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While Prahalad and Doz insightfully drew attention to a new style of corporate 
leadership that implied the need for a reconfiguration of the governance of publicly traded 
companies, various caveats are in order.  First, the transformation of the managerial function 
they remarked upon was not novel in 2000 but instead can be traced back at least a couple of 
decades earlier.  In the years immediately following Chrysler’s 1978 much-heralded hiring of 
the flamboyant Lee Iacocca to execute a corporate turnaround, numerous major U.S. public 
companies turned to youthful (by conventional CEO standards), dynamic individuals to take 
charge.
22
  Correspondingly, by the mid-1980s the media was hailing “A New Breed of CEO” 
bringing “new excitement to rusty companies”23 while at the same time bemoaning a new 
“me-first” attitude among top management.24   
Second, while as the 20
th
 century drew to a close there was awareness of a new style 
of corporate leadership, it is not feasible to measure the magnitude of the change with 
precision.  Empirical testing of the discretion CEOs have available to them is an under-
explored topic,
25
 perhaps because it may not be possible to define CEO power satisfactorily 
along a single measureable dimension.
26
  However, there is some quantitative evidence 
indicating the chief executive role did increase in prominence in the 1980s and 1990s.  A 
growing “CEO pay slice” -- the ratio of CEO total compensation to the average of the pay of 
the other two highest paid officers in U.S. public companies rose from 1.29:  1 in the 1960s to 
                                                          
22
  ROY C. SMITH AND INGO WALTER, GOVERNING THE MODERN CORPORATIONS:  
CAPITAL MARKETS, CORPORATE CONTROL AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 106 (2006). 
23
  N.R. Kleinfield, A New Breed of CEO, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1985, SM 76.    
24
  Ann Crittenden, The Age of “Me-First” Management, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1984, F1.  
25
  Brian K. Boyd and Steve Gove, Managerial Constraint:  The Intersection Between 
Organizational Task Environment and Discretion in RESEARCH METHODOLOGY IN STRATEGY 
AND MANAGEMENT, vol. 3, 4 (working paper version, 2013) (D. Ketchen and D. Bergh, eds., 
forthcoming) (saying searches had revealed only 16 empirical tests of managerial discretion).  
26
  Adair Morse, Vikram Nanda and Amit Seru, Are Incentive Contracts Rigged by 
Powerful CEOs?, J. FIN. 1779, 1792 (2011).    
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1.58:  1 in the 1980s and to 2.58:  1 in the early 2000s
27
 -- arguably reflected the growing 
importance of the CEO as compared to other senior executives.
28
  The proliferation of CEO 
awards, used by Ulrike Malmendier and Geoffrey Tate to identify “superstar CEOs”,29 
similarly demonstrates the growing prominence of chief executives.  While during from the 
mid-1970s to the mid-1980s only the now defunct Financial World magazine identified and 
made awards to CEOs numerous publications began to do likewise in the late 1980s (e.g. 
Business Week, Chief Executive, Industry Week) as did various others around 2000 (e.g. 
Forbes, Morningstar.com, Time/CNN).
30
  
Third, having identified “a new style of corporate leadership” Prahalad and Doz did 
not explain in any detail in their 2000 paper why the shift to senior corporate executives 
leading and managing change had occurred.  Given that CEOs are likely to be granted wider 
latitude when their firms are performing well,
31
 Prahalad and Doz’s “new style” of 
management may have been partially attributable to a dramatic rise in share prices occurring 
during the “The Roaring Nineties.”32  However, even if healthy shareholder returns 
contributed to the occurrence of the “celebrity CEO” phenomenon, various additional factors 
can be identified that reoriented the managerial function in U.S. public companies in a 
manner that set the stage for corporate governance to act as a potentially salutary corrective.  
One was that companies were becoming bigger, meaning that investors had more to lose if 
executives squandered the new latitude available to them.   
                                                          
27
  Carola Frydman and Raven E. Saks, Executive Compensation:  A New View from a 
Long-Term Perspective, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 2099, 2112-13 (2010).   
28
  Lucian Bebchuk, K.J Martijn Cremers and Urs Peyer, The CEO Pay Slice, 102 J. FIN. 
ECON. 199, 200 (2011).    
29
  Ulrike Malmendier and Geoffrey Tate, Superstar CEOs, 124 Q.J. ECON. 1593 (2009).  
30
  Ibid., 1599-1600, 1635-36.  
31
  Daily and Johnson, supra note 15, 104.   
32
  JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE ROARING NINETIES 3, 5 (2003).   
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B. Bigger Companies 
All else being equal the more there is at stake, the more worthwhile it will be for 
careful oversight to occur.  By extension, the greater the value of assets under the control of 
public company executives, the more emphasis there should be on corporate governance.  
This logic may well help to explain corporate governance’s emergence in the 1970s and 
subsequent entrenchment as an essential feature of U.S. capitalism.  Major U.S. public 
companies were becoming larger across various dimensions as corporate governance came to 
the fore and became well-established.  The executives in charge correspondingly merited 
closer scrutiny, particularly given that their companies were operating in a more volatile 
market environment due to deregulation, increased competition and technological advances 
reducing barriers to entry in many industries.
33
   
It might be surprising that large American companies were becoming bigger as 
corporate governance came into vogue.  After all, corporate “downsizing” occurring in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s was much ballyhooed.
34
  Moreover, leading U.S. companies 
achieved a degree of global economic dominance in the managerialist era immediately 
following World War II that was not sustained fully thereafter.
 35
  For instance, as of 1955 
General Motors generated a proportion of America’s entire gross national product roughly 
equivalent to Italy’s entire GNP.36   Nevertheless, on various measures major U.S. public 
companies grew significantly bigger as the corporate governance movement took hold.   
                                                          
33
  ROBERT REICH, SUPERCAPITALISM:  THE BATTLE FOR DEMOCRACY IN AN AGE OF BIG 
BUSINESS 50-70 (2009) (identifying factors that disrupted corporate stability in the U.S. as 
the 20
th
 century drew to a close); see further infra Part II.C and Part II.D.  . 
34
  WYATT WELLS, AMERICAN CAPITALISM, 1945-2000 145-46 (2003).    
35
   REICH, supra note 33, 52.  
36
  Ibid., 29-30. 
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According to a 2001 article in the Wall Street Journal arguing that a merger wave in 
the 1990s had given rise to numerous new corporate behemoths, by 2001 more than 50 U.S. 
public companies had more than 100,000 employees whereas only 18 did in the mid-1980s.
37
  
Moreover, total sales of the top 100 non-oil-U.S. firms increased from 20 per cent of U.S. 
GDP in 1980 to 25 per cent in 2009.
38
  Similarly, the aggregate revenue of Fortune 500 firms 
more than doubled between 1975 and 2005, adjusting for inflation (Fig. 1).     
Figure 1:  Aggregate Revenue of Fortune 500 companies, 1975-2005 
 
Sources:  compiled from data available at 
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500_archive/full/2005 (accessed Sept. 18, 
2013); adjustments for inflation made using CPI via 
http://www.measuringworth.com/uscompare/ (accessed Sept. 18, 2013).   
The market capitalization of U.S. public companies grew even more rapidly than the 
revenues of such firms as the corporate governance movement consolidated.
39
  The average 
                                                          
37
  Matt Murray, Critical Mass, WALL ST. J., Feb. 8, 2001, A1.   
38
  Xavier Gabaix, The Granular Origins of Aggregate Fluctuations, 79 ECONOMETRICA 
733, 734 (2011).    
39
  Marianne Bertrand, CEOs, 1 ANN. REV. ECON. 121, 137 (2009).  
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market value of the largest 500 publicly traded U.S. companies increased six-fold in real 
terms between 1980 and 2003.
40
  There similarly was a substantial increase in the size of the 
U.S. stock market relative to the economy, even making allowances for the “bear” markets 
associated with the dot.com stock market crash and subsequently the financial crisis (Fig. 2).  
With more being at stake for investors, it is not surprising that bolstering managerial 
accountability through improved corporate governance moved on to the priority list.   
Figure 2:  Value of All Listed U.S. Stocks/GDP, 1980-2012 
 
Sources:  Rajan and Zingales (data for 1980)
41
; World Bank (data for 1988-2012)
42
      
C. Deregulation 
Deregulation likely was an additional catalyst for corporate governance’s rise to 
prominence and its subsequent staying power.
43
  In the United States deregulation 
                                                          
40
  Xavier Gabaix and Augustin Landier, Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?, 123 
Q.J. ECON. 49, 72, 94 (2008) (reporting additionally that the increase was even more 
substantial for the top 100 firms).    
41
  Raghuram G. Rajan and Luigi Zingales, The Great Reversals:  The Politics of 
Financial Development in the 20
th
 Century, 69 J. FIN. ECON. 5, 15 (2003).    
42
  Data derived from http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LCAP.GD.ZS 
(accessed Feb. 17, 2014). 
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commenced during the Jimmy Carter administration with the airline and trucking industries, 
moved into full swing under Ronald Reagan in areas such as oil and gas and antitrust 
enforcement and continued in the 1990s with electricity and telecommunications.
44
  This 
process likely intensified managerial agency cost problems and prompted the adoption of 
more rigorous corporate governance as a counter-reaction.
45
   
All else being equal, senior executives running a company in an industry which is 
heavily regulated will have less discretion than their counterparts in industries that do not 
face such restrictions.
46
  Deregulation occurring as the 20
th
 century drew to a close 
correspondingly should have increased the importance of the managerial function in firms 
affected, with constraints on the development of pricing schemes, distribution patterns and 
innovative products unravelling and with the removal of regulatory “safety nets” introducing 
substantial down-side risk for lagging firms.
47
  At the same time, deregulation, by inducing 
increased instability in the business environment, would have increased the costs of 
observing managerial performance, thereby enhancing the value of governance mechanisms 
designed to keep potentially wayward executives in check.
48
  The corporate governance 
movement plausibly developed as at least a partial counterweight to higher agency costs 
deregulation potentially engendered.     
                                                                                                                                                                                    
43
  Prahalad and Dozy explicitly drew attention to deregulation as a factor contributing to 
the growing importance of CEOs:  supra note 16, 20.   
44
  SKEEL, ICARUS, supra note 21, 119-20, 198. 
45
  Kole and Lehn, supra note 6, 421, 425.   
46
  Donald C. Hambrick and Eric Abrahamson, Assessing Managerial Discretion Across 
Industries:  A Multimethod Approach, 38 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1427, 1429 (1995); Sydney 
Finkelstein and Brian K. Boyd, How Much Does the CEO Matter?  The Role of Managerial 
Discretion in the Setting of CEO Compensation, 41 ACAD. MGMT. J. 179, 181 (1998). 
47
  Kole and Lehn, supra note 6, 421.    
48
  Ibid., 421, 423.   
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There is a literature that, consistent with foregoing logic, treats corporate governance 
and regulation as substitutes.
49
  The point cannot be pressed too hard, however in this 
particular context.  This is because corporate governance will not necessarily be a mere 
afterthought when companies are tightly regulated.  Firms in highly regulated industries in 
fact often have more robust corporate governance than their counterparts in unregulated 
industries.
50
  Regulatory pressure stands out as a plausible explanation why.  “Safety-first” 
regulators, knowing they cannot oversee day-to-day operations of regulated firms, could well 
successfully exhort those firms to upgrade corporate governance and internal monitoring 
systems to reinforce constraints regulation imposes.
51
   
D. The Public Company Financial Revolution 
A “financial revolution” U.S. public companies experienced as the 20th century drew 
to a close likely was an additional catalyst for corporate governance’s rise to prominence and 
subsequent staying power.
52
  Due to a wave of financial innovation business enterprises in 
this era could take advantage of a wide range of new techniques to finance their existing 
operations, fresh acquisitions and expansion plans.
53
  By one estimate, public companies in 
the U.S. deployed 76 different varieties of innovative securities between 1970 and 1997 to 
raise over $1.7 trillion from domestic capital markets.
54
  One by-product was an increase in 
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corporate indebtedness, with the liabilities of the non-financial business sector climbing from 
68 per cent of GDP in 1970 to 129 per cent in 2007.
55
   
The financial revolution that occurred in the closing decades of the 20
th
 century had 
significant implications for executives in publicly traded companies.  As Randall Thomas 
argued in 2004, “The opportunities for American executives expanded tremendously.”56  Or 
as Sydney Finkelstein, Donald Hambrick and Albert Cannella observed in 2009, “Beyond the 
obvious trend of deregulation…societal and economic trends…have expanded the choices for 
senior executives.”57   
The improved ability of firms to challenge vertically integrated “first movers” that 
dominated numerous key sectors of the U.S. economy during the middle of the 20
th
 century 
illustrates how the financial revolution opened up opportunities for corporate executives.  The 
dominant first-movers traditionally had little to fear from rivals because potential upstarts 
lacked the financial firepower to muster a serious challenge.
58
  As the 20
th
 century drew to a 
close, however, the growing availability of finance eroded the advantages previously 
unassailable incumbents had, with technology often accelerating the process by allowing new 
entrants to replicate the specialized resources of first-movers with minimal fuss.
59
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While improved access to finance would have given executives of public companies 
increased room to manoeuvre, debt increases risk.
60
  The financial revolution U.S. public 
companies experienced correspondingly should have magnified concerns shareholders would 
have had that management might squander the new opportunities available.  This in turn 
should have increased investor receptivity to the idea that corporate governance had a 
beneficial agency cost reduction role to play.  Hence, an important collateral effect of the 
liberating but potentially disruptive finance revolution public companies experienced may 
well have been to help to foster and sustain corporate governance’s rise to prominence.   
E. A New Corporate Governance Equilibrium (?) 
While deregulation, a financial revolution and technological change all could have 
plausibly fostered receptivity to more robust corporate governance, self-corrective 
mechanisms would have come into play that could have meant accountability gaps would not 
have been a source of serious concern despite a potential expansion of managerial discretion.  
Increased borrowing should have imposed a check on executives of the public companies of 
the 1980s and 1990s because they would have been apprehensive about their companies 
generating sufficient revenue to service growing debt burdens.
61
  Moreover, markets for 
products and services, as bolstered by technology and deregulation, should have been a more 
potent disciplinary mechanism than would have been the case during the managerialist 
heyday of the 1950s and 1960s.
62
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While increased debt and more robust competition from rivals should have helped to 
keep executives on their toes, as the 20
th
 century drew to a close there was a general 
consensus that, consistent with Prahalad and Doz’s identification of “a more visible corporate 
leadership”,63 executives had scope to create (and presumably destroy) value in a way that 
they did not previously.  Roy Smith and Ingo Walter have said of the 1980s, 
“Companies with charismatic, results-oriented chief executives with bold strategies 
and good media skills were rewarded with higher stock prices, and their CEOs were 
in turn rewarded with more generous compensation packages.  CEOs recognized the 
pattern, and many adapted themselves to benefit from it.”64 
By 1999 matters had progressed to the point where, as the Economist observed, “Many 
investors in America…believe that bosses have more influence over their companies than 
they used to….”65  The Economist itself seemed to agree, saying in an editorial the same year 
“An able chief executive has extraordinary power to make or break a company.”66  The 
upshot, as Rakesh Khurana said in his 2002 book Searching for a Corporate Savior, was that 
the definition of an effective CEO had changed “from that of competent manager to 
charismatic leader.”67  It would seem, therefore, that whatever additional discipline greater 
debt and more competitive markets might have imposed on U.S. public companies senior 
executives had expanded discretion available to them the exercise of which corporate 
governance could help to keep within tolerable bounds.  
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Alan Greenspan, chairman of the Federal Reserve of the United States from 1987 to 
2006, said in Congressional testimony in 2002 that in public companies the chief executive 
was “the fulcrum of governance”.68  This implies that the era of the “celebrity” or “imperial” 
CEO
69
 should have coincided with a bolstering of corporate governance that would provide a 
beneficial check on the new style of corporate leadership by ensuring that the right people 
were hired, that those in charge were suitably incentivized and that underperformers were 
required to move on.  This indeed occurred.  From the mid-1980s through the 1990s boards 
were strengthened, executive pay was restructured to align pay more closely with 
performance and shareholders became increasingly willing to step forward to influence 
managerial turnover.
70
  The Economist observed in 1999 that a spate of CEO dismissals 
occurring in the early 1990s had “change(d) the balance of power between shareholders and 
boards at big American firms” and suggested “incompetent chief executives in large 
companies (were) rarer than they were in 1990.”71  Economists Bengt Holmstrom and Steven 
Kaplan struck a similar chord in a 2001 survey of corporate governance, saying that “since 
the mid-1980s, the U.S. style of corporate governance had reinvented itself” and predicted 
that “a more market-oriented corporate governance than existed up to the early 1980s is here 
to stay.”72   
The corporate scandals affecting Enron, WorldCom and various other prominent U.S. 
public companies in the early 2000s would quickly make these favourable assessments of 
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U.S. corporate governance seem somewhat naive.  Corporate governance, however, did not 
stand still.  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 imposed various new governance-related 
requirements on publicly traded companies.  Moreover, according to former S.E.C. chairman 
Arthur Levitt, the scandals that prompted SOX’s enactment accelerated “a cultural change in 
corporate America” oriented around tougher boards and increasingly active shareholders.73  
Levitt indeed claimed in 2005 in the wake of dismissals of CEOs at well-known public 
companies such as Hewlett-Packard and Disney that the days of “the autocratic, muscular 
CEO” were gone -- “[t]he imperial CEO [was] no more.”74   
There was widespread agreement at the time that Levitt’s assessment was on the 
mark.  A Financial Times columnist said in 2005 corporate scandals occurring as the decade 
had opened “marked the beginning of the end of the imperial chief executive.”75  Robert 
Dilenschneider, founder of a public relations firm with clients comprising one-third of the 
Fortune 500,
76
 argued the same year that “What’s needed now is a different kind of CEO:  
Men and women who shed the trappings of imperial power (and) work with their boards of 
directors.”77   
The consensus that the corporate scandals of the early 2000s and SOX’s enactment 
had prompted “a governance revolution”78 was sustained thereafter.  According to a 2007 
Wall Street Journal article entitled “After the Revolt”, the CEO dismissals occurring in the 
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mid-2000s represented a “new, post-revolutionary generation of power in corporate America” 
exemplified by CEOs “on shorter leashes, more beholden to their boards of directors.”79  
Greenspan observed in a chapter on corporate governance in a 2007 memoir that “the 
autocratic-CEO paradigm appears to be the only arrangement that allows for effective 
functioning of the corporation” but conceded that “In the aftermath of the Enron and 
WorldCom scandals, the power of the corporate CEO has been diminished and that of the 
board of directors and shareholders enhanced.”80   
By 2010 the reorientation of U.S. corporate governance away from celebrity CEOs 
had reached the point where Marcel Kahan and Ed Rock could characterize U.S. chief 
executives as “Embattled”.81  This coincided with a general maturation of corporate 
governance in U.S. public companies.  As Omari Simmons argued in a 2013 law review 
article, “Over the past thirty years, corporate governance, despite occasional bumps, has 
undoubtedly improved.”82  Arguably, then, in the wake of the corporate scandals and 
legislative reforms of the early 2000s there was a reasonably fully executed transition from an 
equilibrium oriented around the constrained form of capitalism in place during the 
managerialist heyday of the 1950s and 1960s in favour of an equilibrium suited to the more 
freewheeling market conditions that emerged thereafter.
83
  The rise of corporate governance 
and its continued prominence stand out as legacies of this process.  
III. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE COMES TO THE FORE – THE CASE OF BANKS 
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A. Why the History Matters 
Deficient corporate governance at U.S. financial firms has been identified as a 
potential cause of the financial crisis.
84
  Whether this is an appropriate diagnosis is not 
entirely clear.  The U.S. system of corporate governance performed tolerably well under 
difficult conditions as the crisis loomed
85
 and empirical research on pre-financial crisis 
governance arrangements in publicly traded bank holding companies and non-financial firms 
indicates that on average banks were no worse governed than non-financial firms.
86
  Still, 
while in general terms corporate governance in banks may not have been markedly sub-
standard as the financial crisis approached, governance arrangements in financial companies 
were not identical to those in non-financial companies.
87
  Distinctive corporate governance 
features of banks may in turn have contributed to the onset of the financial crisis.   
Part IV of the paper will identify a potentially crucial governance distinction between 
financial companies and their non-financial counterparts, this being that the “imperial” CEO 
side-lined for the most part due to the corporate governance turmoil of the early 2000s 
remained a prominent feature in the financial sector immediately prior to the onset of the 
financial crisis.  Arguably, due to this corporate governance “free pass”, autocratic chief 
executives of banks had scope to pursue misguided policies that jeopardized their firms, the 
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financial sector generally and ultimately the entire U.S. economy.  This Part of the paper will 
set the scene by indicating that the trends that helped to bring corporate governance to the 
fore with U.S. public companies generally, namely executives running larger corporations 
with more discretion than they had in the heyday of managerial capitalism, were relevant to 
financial companies.  Part IV will then discuss how the chronology took a potentially 
significant twist with financial companies.    
B. Bigger Banks 
One likely reason why corporate governance became entrenched as part of U.S. 
corporate life in the manner it did as the 20
th
 century drew to a close was that more was at 
stake, in the sense that major publicly traded companies were becoming considerably larger 
along various dimensions.
88
  This trend was, if anything, more pronounced with financial 
firms over the same period.  The size of the financial sector grew markedly, comprising 8.3 
per cent of U.S. GDP in 2006 as compared with 4.9 per cent in 1980.
89
  Similarly, the 
financial services industry generated 40 per cent of total domestic corporate profits in 2007 as 
compared with 10 per cent in the early 1980s and the industry’s share of stock market value 
grew from 6 per cent to 19 per cent over the same period.
90
   
The financial sector was not simply getting bigger.  In addition, the dominant firms --
the ones most likely to be prominent publicly traded corporations -- were more than keeping 
pace.  The assets of the six largest U.S. commercial banks increased fourfold as a proportion 
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of GDP between 1994 and 2009.
91
  Likewise, among companies large enough to be part of 
the S&P 500 stock market index, the market value of financial firms amounted to 22.3 per 
cent of the S&P 500 in early 2007 as compared to 8.8 per cent in 1989 and 13 per cent in 
1999.
92
 
C. Deregulation 
Deregulation, as was the case with the emergence of bigger firms, not only likely 
contributed to the growing prominence of corporate governance between the 1970s and the 
2000s
93
 but also probably was a more pronounced trend with banks than it was generally.  In 
response to widespread banking failures occurring during the Great Depression, the U.S. 
federal government put in place a regulatory regime which prioritized eliminating risk and 
ensuring banking stability.
94
  By virtue of the Banking Act of 1933,
95
 supplemented by the 
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956
96
 and other measures, the commercial banking industry 
became one of the most heavily regulated sectors of the U.S. economy.
97
   
An important way in which banking was regulated was to cordon banks off from 
market forces by barring potential competitors, such as securities firms, from engaging in 
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core aspects of banking.
98
  Concomitantly, banks were largely precluded from carrying out 
business activities unrelated to banking, meaning in this context taking deposits and making 
loans.
99
  Banks were also protected from competition within their own industry.
100
  Bank 
charters were rationed by state and federal bank regulators and the Banking Act of 1933 
authorized the Federal Reserve Board to impose ceilings on rates of interest payable on bank 
deposits.
101
  Moreover, the 1933 and 1956 legislation supplemented pre-existing federal and 
state laws designed to ensure banking remained geographically fragmented.
102
   
With strict regulation in place, for nearly fifty years after the enactment of the 
Banking Act of 1933 the United States experienced an era of “boring” banking.103  
Commercial banking was characterized by stable profits and a very low failure rate;
104
 with 
an average of fewer than six banks among thousands failing per year between 1942 and 
1980.
105
  Bankers were said to follow a 3-6-3 business model, borrowing at 3 per cent, 
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lending at 6 per cent and golfing by 3 o’clock.106  George Moore, who led the worldwide 
expansion of First National City Bank (later Citibank and Citigroup) in the 1950s and was 
chairman of the board from 1967 to 1970, said in his 1987 memoir “banking is the surest, 
safest, easiest business I have seen or known.”107  
Investment banking, though riskier than commercial banking, was also subject to 
constraints in the decades following the Depression that meant firms were run along 
conservative lines.
108
  Investment banks were not regulated for safety and soundness in the 
same way as commercial banks.
109
  Still, the provisions in the 1933 banking legislation that 
came to be known as the Glass-Stegall Act reduced considerably the freedom of action of 
investment banks by prohibiting any entity carrying out securities underwriting from 
engaging in deposit banking.
110
  The organizational form investment banks deployed also 
fostered prudence.   
For a number of decades following the enactment of Glass-Stegall investment banks 
were general partnerships where the partners were personally liable for debts of their firms.
111
  
The fact that partners’ personal wealth was at stake if things went seriously awry fostered a 
conservative mind set.
112
  For instance, Goldman Sachs’ first business principle was that their 
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clients’ interests came first, with its partnership structure encouraging bankers to be “greedy, 
but long-term greedy.”113  The fact that investment banks were partnerships also imposed 
limits on growth because in a highly cyclical industry they lacked sufficient permanent 
capital to underwrite every major transaction they could theoretically work on and to expand 
operations in a systematic way.
114
  This all began to change in 1970 when the New York 
Stock Exchange repealed a rule precluding its members from being publicly owned.
115
  
Prompted initially by the need to finance back-office computerization required due to rapidly 
growing transaction volume,
116
 over the next two decades most major investment banks went 
public, thus marking the end of the partner liability regime that helped to foster conservatism 
among such firms.
117
   
Change was also afoot with commercial banks.  During the 1970s and 1980s it was 
becoming increasingly evident “the legal regime originally designed to protect the banking 
industry by walling competitors out of the banks’ profitable preserve had begun instead to 
trap banks within a shrinking market.”118  Investment banks, mutual funds and the finance 
arms of major industrial and commercial companies took advantage of rapidly evolving 
technology to develop innovative financial products that provided stiff competition for banks’ 
                                                          
113
  Mary Kissel, How the Banker Went to Vegas, WALL ST. J., October 10, 2013, A15.    
114
  Terry Robards, Wall St. Watches and Hopes, as Bache Offers Shares, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 12, 1971, F2 (discussing reasons for Bache & Co., then the nation’s second-largest 
brokerage house, going public); CHARLES R. GEISST, THE LAST PARTNERSHIPS:  INSIDE THE 
GREAT WALL STREET MONEY DYNASTIES 6-7, 227, 314-15 (2001).   
115
  Hill and Painter, supra note 109, 1177; ALAN D. MORRISON AND WILLIAM J. 
WILHELM, INVESTMENT BANKING:  INSTITUTIONS, POLITICS, AND LAW 278 (2007). 
116
  MORRISON AND WILHELM, supra note 115, 237-38, 277-78.  
117
  Hill and Painter, supra note 109, 1177; NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF 
THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 90, 62; Christopher 
M. Bruner, Conceptions of Corporate Purpose in Post-Crisis Financial Firms, 36 SEATTLE 
UNIV. L. REV. 541, 549 (2013). 
118
  Klausner, supra note 94, 696. 
28 
 
deposit and loan services.
119
  Bank customers began leaving in droves, evidenced by a 
massive outflow from bank accounts sparked by the high inflation and rising interest rates of 
the 1970s.
120
   
To permit banks to counteract the shift to deposit substitutes Congress largely phased 
out interest rate controls during the early and mid-1980s.
121
  Additional bank deregulation 
soon followed.  In 1994, Congress put in place a national framework for interstate banking, 
culminating a process various states had begun in the late 1970s.
122
  Similarly, the 1999 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
123
 was the key final chapter in a dismantling of barriers between 
commercial and investment banking as it expressly permitted the creation of full-service 
financial holding companies.
124
   
Deregulation duly helped to transform the formerly “boring” banking sector.  Banks 
responded to the unleashing of market forces by engaging in an unprecedented wave of 
consolidation which caused the number of banking organizations in the U.S. to fall from 
almost 15,000 in 1980 to under 8,000 in 2008.
125
  Larger banks, for their part, moved into 
new lines of business with the intention of creating financial “supermarkets” that could 
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provide a full range of financial services to customers.
126
  Deregulation, in sum, provided 
senior executives of major financial firms with the sort of expanded managerial latitude to 
which corporate governance theoretically could operate as a beneficial corrective.   
D. “Bright New Finance” 
A late 20
th
 century finance “revolution” U.S. public companies experienced expanded 
opportunities available to American executives and in so doing likely helped to bring 
corporate governance to prominence.
127
  The financial landscape for banks similarly changed 
markedly, and in ways that should have increased managerial latitude and thereby made 
governance a higher priority.  Major investment banks experienced a pronounced financial 
transformation due to converting themselves into publicly traded firms, which greatly 
facilitated their access to capital.
128
  Moreover, leading investment banks, which were already 
highly leveraged by 2000, became more so as the financial crisis approached.  While 
prosperous large non-financial companies rarely have equity representing less than 30 per 
cent of assets,
129
 the equivalent figure for the largest U.S. investment banks fell from 3.7 per 
cent in 2000 to just 2.8 per cent in 2007.
130
   
The largest U.S. commercial banks also became increasingly highly leveraged as the 
financial crisis approached, with equity representing 6.6 per cent of assets in 2000 but only 
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4.5 per cent in 2007.
131
  This trend, however, needs to be put into context.  Corporations vary 
widely with respect to their use of debt and banks pretty much universally have compared to 
non-financial firms less equity relative to assets.
132
  Hence, even during the conservative 3-6-
3 banking era U.S. banks had equity levels hovering around 6 per cent of assets.
133
  
Moreover, in contrast with the trend for the largest banks, on an aggregate basis leverage 
became less pronounced in the banking sector as the financial crisis approached.  Likely due 
to the introduction of laws requiring regulators to intervene when banks failed to meet 
specified minimum capital requirements, among commercial banks generally equity 
represented nearly 10 per cent of assets by the mid-2000s.
134
  
Though with commercial banks there was no uniform trend with leverage, a corporate 
finance-related reconfiguration still marked the end of the cautious 3-6-3 era.  Banking was 
already moving out of the “boring” category by late 1980s, with national commercial banks 
ranking 36
th
 out of 70 industries in a study measuring managerial discretion by reference to 
industry characteristics such as market growth, capital intensity, product differentiability and 
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demand instability (variation in growth rates).
135
  During the 1990s numerous major banks 
adopted increasingly aggressive strategies with assets they held and with loans they made, 
meaning they had a riskier asset/liability mix even when equity capital was being boosted.
136
  
The process continued apace in the 2000s, with the “megabanks” that were emerging during 
this era making increasingly risky loans, engaging heavily in the manufacturing of securities 
(securitization) and bolstering trading of complex financial assets.
137
  As William Bratton and 
Michael Wachter observed in 2010, “Such a change in business strategy meant a move to 
greater expected returns and greater risk.”138   
The Economist characterized the changes to banking fostered by deregulation and 
financial innovation as the replacement of “traditional banking” with “bright new finance”.139  
From a corporate governance perspective a key corollary of this shift was that, as was the 
case with the corporate finance revolution affecting non-financial companies, top executives 
of investment and commercial banks would have had greater managerial latitude than their 
counterparts immediately following World War II.  Given this, and given that banks were 
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getting bigger and were operating in an increasingly deregulated environment “bright new 
finance” logically should have been accompanied by more robust corporate governance.   
Corporate governance indeed did grow in prominence with U.S. banks as the 20
th
 
century drew to a close.  The proportion of board seats held by outside directors of large bank 
holding companies was higher than it was for industrial companies.
140
  Banks substantially 
increased their use of incentive-oriented executive compensation.
141
  Boards and institutional 
shareholders also began taking more aggressive measures to discipline poorly performing 
bank executives.
142
  David Skeel even observed in 1999 that “More than ever before, the 
governance of U.S. banks…has come to resemble the governance of other U.S. firms.”143   
Skeel did not go so far as to claim that corporate governance arrangements in banks 
had become functionally identical to those in non-financial firms.  Instead, he said “it would 
be a mistake to conclude that bank…governance will soon look just like nonfinancial firm 
governance.”144  This was a prudent concession because, even if the corporate governance 
movement had a substantial impact on the banking sector, the corporate governance of banks 
and non-financial companies continued to differ in significant ways immediately prior to the 
financial crisis.
145
  We will turn now to distinctive features of bank governance that plausibly 
contributed to the onset of the financial crisis, with the most prominent being a corporate 
governance “free pass” banks enjoyed due primarily to delivering robust financial results in 
comparison to other companies.    
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IV. PRE-FINANCIAL CRISIS CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:  HOW BANKS DIFFERED 
A. Persistence of the Imperial CEO 
The Enron and WorldCom debacles and the 2002 enactment of SOX eclipsed the 
“imperial CEO” who initially achieved prominence in U.S. public companies in the 1980s.146  
Matters were different with financial companies, where powerful, charismatic CEOs 
remained a prominent feature throughout the mid-2000s.  For instance, Stan O’Neal, who as 
chief executive of Merrill Lynch from 2002 and 2007 drove the company to make large, ill-
advised bets on mortgage securities that imperilled its future and fuelled the mortgage boom 
that helped to precipitate the financial crisis, had an autocratic leadership style fostered by his 
hiring of a youthful management team that lacked the experience or stature to challenge 
him.
147
   
O’Neal was by no means exceptional.  Chuck Prince, who became Citigroup’s CEO 
in 2003 and its chairman of the board in 2006, was described in 2005 by American Banker 
magazine as the “king within the walls of Citigroup”148 to whom Citigroup’s board reputedly 
was “willing to give more and more rope.”149  In 2007 the New York Times characterized 
Jimmy Cayne, chief executive and chairman of the board of Bear Stearns just prior to its 
hastily engineered rescue in March 2008 by J.P Morgan, as a throwback “to an earlier era of 
Wall Street partnerships tightly controlled by the towering will and stubborn dictates of their 
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managing partners.”150  Angelo Mozilo, co-founder of mortgage lender Countrywide 
Financial and chief executive when the company was sold to Bank of America at a financial 
crisis-related knockdown price in early 2008, had a managerial style that provided scope for a 
“friends of Angelo” list that afforded politicians access to loans under favourable terms.151  
He was also described in a 2000 Forbes article as “the Rommel of the mortgage business” 
and “[t]he bad boy of the mortgage industry.”152   
Mozilo and Richard Fuld, chairman and chief executive of Lehman Brothers from 
1994 until its September 2008 bankruptcy that amounted to “ground zero” of the financial 
crisis, were both included in Barron’s 2007 list of the world’s 30 best CEOs.  Barron’s said 
of Fuld that he “brings passion and competitiveness that are powerful even by (Wall) Street 
standards.”153  Fuld was also described in a 2009 book on the firm’s collapse as “King 
Richard” who “turned Lehman’s board of directors into a kind of irrelevant lower 
chamber.”154   
The persistence of the imperial CEO in the banking sector had potentially significant 
implications, with excessive deference to powerful chief executives standing out as a 
potential cause of the financial crisis.  As the crisis played out one charge levelled against 
financial companies and their corporate governance was that boards had been too complacent 
about risks management was running, with American Banker magazine suggesting in a 2008 
cover story “At far too many banks…the attitude was to let the good times roll when 
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executives should have been nibbling their fingernails down to the quick.”155  Another 
criticism was that boards missed the plot when setting executive pay, arguably contributing 
“to the mortgage boom and financial bust by encouraging their celebrity CEOs to take risks 
so they could make even bigger numbers.”156  Charges levelled against governance in 
financial firms are, moreover, not merely of historical interest.  A Financial Times columnist 
argued in 2012 that “if the U.S. again places its trust in the autocratic instincts of a new 
generation of corporate leaders, it will lay the foundation for the next (financial crisis).”157    
Why did financial companies get what appeared to be a mid-2000s corporate 
governance “free pass” in the form of tolerance of free-wheeling celebrity CEOs?  The 
regulatory terrain applicable to banks is a possible explanation, though ultimately not a 
persuasive one.  Other distinctive features of banks could have played a role, particularly a 
bias bank shareholders may have had in favor of managers “rolling the dice”.  What was 
probably most important, however, was that financial companies delivered robust shareholder 
returns in comparison to other firms, thereby insulating them, at least temporarily, from the 
corporate governance pressures their non-financial counterparts encountered.   
B. Regulation 
Regulation and corporate governance are potentially substitutes,
158
 with careful 
oversight by regulators arguably reducing the need for boards and shareholders to monitor 
management closely.  Correspondingly, to the extent that regulators supervise bank 
management rigorously such oversight could render corporate governance scrutiny 
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superfluous.
159
  Perhaps, then, the corporate governance “free pass” was issued to banks in 
the years immediately preceding the financial crisis because of an implicit assumption 
regulation was ensuring executives were not going off the track.   
Direct oversight of governance arrangements has traditionally not been a feature of 
U.S. banking regulation.
160
  Nevertheless various features of the regulatory scheme applicable 
to banks extend implicitly into the corporate governance realm.
161
  As early as 1933 federal 
banking law authorized the removal of directors of banks operating under federal jurisdiction 
who had engaged in unsafe or unsound banking practices.
162
  In 1989 the authority to suspend 
and remove top management was enhanced, with action being permitted upon determination 
of substantial financial loss or damage or financial gain or other benefit.
163
  Moreover, 
pursuant to a legislative mandate introduced in 1991 requiring federal banking regulators to 
develop standards to maintain safety and soundness in the banking sector, banks were put 
under an onus to set up internal control systems so as to improve the ability of managers to 
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monitor their bank’s activities and to ensure compliance with the law.164  Reforms introduced 
in 1991 also provided regulators with the power to dismiss officers and directors of seriously 
undercapitalized banks.
165
   
While deregulation was a key trend in the banking sector as the 20
th
 century drew to a 
close,
166
 due in part to the rules relating to the disciplining of directors and officers U.S. laws 
governing risk-taking by banks remained strict by international standards.
167
  Moreover, U.S. 
banks continued to be more heavily regulated than non-financial public companies, and in 
ways that were potentially relevant for corporate governance.  James Fanto observed in a 
2006 article contrasting regulation of management of banks and publicly traded companies 
operating in other sectors,  
“The picture of regulation of bank management that emerges…is one of all-
encompassing oversight….Historically, in stark contrast to bank management, 
officers and directors of a typical public company were subject to little substantive 
regulatory oversight…. The selection of and standards for officers and directors are 
essentially industry and market issues….”168 
While regulation remained a significant feature of the banking industry during the 
2000s and while regulation can theoretically substitute for robust corporate governance, on 
balance it is unlikely that the regulatory regime under which U.S. banks were operating 
explains their mid-2000s corporate governance free pass.  In general terms, as we have seen, 
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regulation and corporate governance can, depending on the stance regulators take, be 
complements instead of substitutes.
169
  Moreover, during the mid-2000s a number of the 
highest profile financial firms, such as the five leading investment banks (Morgan Stanley, 
Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns),
170
 were not subject to 
the banking laws that impinged on directors and officers of commercial banks.   
Even with commercial banks that were subject to the full panoply of bank regulation 
it was well-known that they were operating in a riskier, more adventurous way than their 3-6-
3 forerunners, implying that corporate governance should not have been a mere afterthought.  
The Economist said of U.S. banks in 2000 “(B)ank managers, long thought of as sober sorts, 
have, in effect, tried all sorts of ways to turn banking into a high-growth business.  They have 
bought other banks, slashed costs, gone into pastures new and taken more risk, in many 
different guises.”171  Or as David Skeel said in 1999, “These are not your father’s financial 
intermediaries….”172  Hence, to the extent that financial firms received a corporate 
governance free pass while managerial discretion was being curtailed more generally post-
Enron/SOX, it does not appear that the reason was that regulation rendered corporate 
governance superfluous.   
C. Distinctive Corporate Governance Features of Banks 
Regulation aside, financial companies differ from their non-financial counterparts in 
various ways that can impact on corporate governance.
173
  Banks, for instance, tend to be 
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more opaque, in the sense that the quality of bank assets are usually less observable than 
those of non-financial companies,
174
 which in turn makes it more difficult to monitor 
managerial decision-making.
175
  In addition, banks have key creditors (depositors) whose 
incentives to monitor are attenuated as compared with conventional creditors because deposit 
insurance provides a safety net.
176
  Moreover, banks of a substantial size can, due to 
interconnectedness with key aspects of the financial system, quite easily become “too big to 
fail” and shareholders in such firms, being confident of a bailout, have incentives to lobby 
managers to “roll the dice” to exploit the lower cost of capital such banks enjoy.177   
These differences, while pertinent in a general sense with the corporate governance of 
banks, seemingly should not have set the stage for a mid-2000s “free pass” for bank 
executives.  Instead, along each dimension the distinctions between banks and non-financial 
companies imply bank executives would have scope to engage in counterproductive risk-
taking unavailable to their non-financial counterparts.  Logically, then, boards of banks 
should have been vigilant monitors rather than dispensers of a “free pass” to management.   
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The shareholder angle merits further consideration, however, particularly because 
various prominent figures in the corporate governance field said shareholders helped to cause 
the financial crisis.
178
  While shareholders in a bank likely to be rescued will be particularly 
susceptible to a “gung ho” managerial style, all bank shareholders will have a bias in favor of 
high-risk/high return strategies because they will have a capped downside due to limited 
liability and will capture the full upside if all goes well.
179
  There is empirical evidence 
implying that boards of at least some banks counterproductively deferred to risk-preferring 
shareholder preferences as the financial crisis approached.  According to a “management 
insulation index” developed by Daniel Ferreira, David Kershaw, Tom Kirchmaier, and 
Edmund Schuster to measure how readily a majority coalition of shareholders could capture 
control of bank boards, U.S. banks that were susceptible to shareholder pressure prior to the 
financial crisis were prone to engage in potentially risky non-traditional banking activities 
such as investment banking and the trading of complex securities and were appreciably more 
likely to be bailed out when the financial crisis hit.
180
      
D. Stock Market Outperformance 
While shareholder preferences may have contributed to the “free pass” bank 
executives seemingly received as the financial crisis approached, financial outperformance 
was an even more important reason why the post-Enron/SOX corporate governance trends 
affecting U.S. public companies generally had a muted immediate impact on financial 
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companies.  The corporate governance of publicly traded companies is more likely to be 
subject to critical scrutiny when financial results are poor.
181
  Conversely, top executives of 
companies that are performing well are likely to be granted substantial latitude,
182
 and banks 
fell into the latter category during the early and mid-2000s.   
In contrast with many U.S. public companies banks generated strong shareholder 
returns as the dot.com stock market boom ended and scandals such as Enron rocked corporate 
America.  The corporate governance free pass duly followed.  According to a July 2008 
American Banker article describing how weak financial results banks had been delivering 
over the previous year had prompted greater vigilance among directors, “the passage of that 
reform legislation (SOX) coincided with an extended run of profitability in the banking 
industry, and discussions about the consequences of weak corporate governance were mostly 
theoretical.”183  Or as a stock market analyst said of bank directors at the same time, they 
“realize they now have to be on top of things, have to be the ones who make sure 
management is actually accounting for risk….Of course, that always should have been the 
case, but at least they are stepping up now.”184  Even shareholders otherwise inclined to lobby 
for change seemed prepared to cut banks slack post-Enron, with the number of instances 
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where bank shareholders made filings with the SEC indicating an intention to engage in 
activism falling by nearly one-third in 2002-05 as compared with 1997-2001.
185
   
The stock market performance of financial companies between 2000 and 2007 reveals 
why discussions of weak corporate governance were largely “theoretical” prior to the 
financial crisis.  While the S&P 500 dropped nearly 50 per cent between March 2000 and 
September 2002 as the “dot.com” bull market went into reverse and corporate scandals hit,186 
share prices of banks in the S&P 500 actually increased (Fig. 3).  Bank shares then continued 
to perform well for the next five years while the stock market overall was struggling to 
recover ground lost during the 2000-02 bear market (Fig. 3).   
Figure 3:  S&P 500/S&P 500 Banks, 2000-2009 
 
Source:  Bratton and Wachter (2010), supra note 92, 718.  
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The stock market outperformance by banks that likely insulated bank executives from 
post-Enron/SOX governance scrutiny was backed up solid financial results.  Profits financial 
companies generated increased an average of 13.8 per cent annually in the decade ending in 
2006, compared with 8.5 per cent for nonfinancial companies.
187
  The underlying difficulty 
was sustainability.  Banks could prosper during the mid-2000s because loan growth was 
strong and defaults were uncommon due to a reasonably stable economy, rising asset prices 
and low interest rates.
188
  However, financial sector growth was racing ahead of the real 
economy, leaving banks highly vulnerable.  In 2008 the Economist likened the financial 
services industry to the resilient but hapless Looney Tunes cartoon character “Wile E. 
Coyote, running over the edge of a cliff,” explaining that the industry had “defied gravity by 
using debt, securitisation and proprietary trading to boost fee income and profits.”189  When 
the fall came the corporate governance free pass was emphatically over.   
V. BANK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS:  TOWARDS A NEW 
EQUILIBRIUM  
A. In the Midst of the Crisis 
In 2006, a robust housing boom that the U.S. had been experiencing ended abruptly 
and mortgage defaults grew dramatically.
190
  In 2007, notable financial companies such as 
Citigroup, Wachovia, Bank of America, Morgan Stanley, Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns 
were in a seriously weakened state due to the deeply troubled U.S. mortgage market.
191
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Share prices of banks began to fall in mid-2007, a few months prior to the beginning of the 
“bear” market that would be associated with the financial crisis (Fig. 3).  In 2008, the bottom 
fell out, as share prices of financial companies in the S&P 500 declined nearly 60 per cent.
192
  
The onset of the financial crisis ended whatever corporate governance free pass 
executives of financial companies had enjoyed.  The June 2008 American Banker article that 
indicated corporate governance concerns that had been largely theoretical in the banking 
sector after the enactment of SOX observed “No longer.”193  There was, for instance, strong 
criticism of generous executive pay arrangements of various financial companies embroiled 
in the crisis.
194
  Also, while shareholders generally eschewed challenging publicly bank 
executives as the financial crisis mounted, perhaps being fearful of making a bad situation 
worse,
195
 2008 was the year between 1994 and 2010 with the highest number of instances 
where bank shareholders made filings with the SEC indicating an intention to engage in 
activism.
196
  
Boards also stepped up to the plate.  Amidst growing criticism of directors of 
financial companies and various recommendations by shareholder advisory firms to clients to 
vote against nominations to board seats banks proposed,
197
 boards began orchestrating 
managerial turnover at a rapid clip.  Chuck Prince was a prominent casualty.  In November 
2007 he resigned under pressure as Citigroup’s CEO and chairman of the board and Citigroup 
split the role of CEO and chairman thereafter, with the implicit mandate of the chairman 
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being to monitor carefully the new CEO’s performance.198  More generally, of the 15 
financial companies sufficiently adversely affected by the onset of the financial crisis to be 
removed from the S&P 500 during 2008 (Citigroup was not one of these), seven fired their 
CEOs in the months before removal and other senior executives were replaced at three other 
such firms.
199
   
B. Aftermath 
The end of the corporate governance free pass for financial firms did not forestall the 
subsequent economic pain the financial crisis would deliver.  The stock market swoon 
continued during the opening months of 2009, with the S&P 500 bottoming out in March 
after a decline of nearly 55 per cent from October 2007.
200
  The U.S. economy shrank by 4 
per cent in the year following the October 2008 collapse of Lehman Brothers and the 
unemployment rate more than doubled from the beginning of the recession (4.8 per cent) to 
October 2009 (10.2 per cent).
201
   
In the wake of the financial crisis the corporate governance free pass was not about to 
be restored.  Instead, governance practices in banks received heightened attention.
202
  The 
imperial CEO who featured prominently in leading financial companies in mid-2000s was a 
noteworthy casualty.  A columnist for the Globe & Mail, a leading Canadian newspaper, 
picked up early on the point.  Writing in early 2009, he observed that historians would be 
able to “carbon-date that extinct species known as the celebrity CEO” to hearings of the 
                                                          
198
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House Financial Services Committee where members of the Committee grilled chief 
executives of the eight largest financial firms in the U.S.
203
   
Subsequent events confirmed the demise of the celebrity CEO in the banking sector.  
The Wall Street Journal suggested in a 2012 article that “The financial industry may be going 
through the same transformation witnessed by corporate America when imperial CEOs á la 
Jack Welch (General Electric CEO from 1981 to 2001)…gave way to more understated and 
more socially aware figures….”204  The newspaper returned to the theme in 2013, saying that 
“Large banks, burned by years of scandal, often with swashbuckling CEOs at the helm, are 
turning to new bosses who sport well-polished veneers of boringness.”205  Even JP Morgan 
Chase, whose CEO and chairman of the board Jamie Dimon was labelled in 2012 the “last 
star CEO,”206 responded in 2013 to criticism of Dimon’s power by appointing two new 
independent directors and by designating a “lead independent director” with power to call 
board meetings and a mandate to guide consideration of CEO succession.
207
  As for why the 
change might be good for banks, the Group of Thirty, an international think tank comprised 
of central bankers and senior bank executives, said in a 2012 report on effective corporate 
governance: 
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“Given a choice between a very good CEO and a ‘star’ CEO, the former is preferable 
to the latter.  Very good CEOs tend to get the job done reliably, without undue 
fanfare… Star CEOs, by contrast, may conflate the institution’s success with their 
personal goals…and they may start to believe their own press.”208 
Arthur Levitt, when he drew attention to the mid-2000s “cultural change in corporate 
America”209 involving a shift away from celebrity CEOs, attributed the trend primarily to 
market factors rather than regulation.  He said that while Sarbanes-Oxley and related reforms 
“corrected some of the more egregious structural problems of the 1990s, they are not what are 
driving this shake-up.”210  Levitt identified major institutional shareholders and the media as 
the primary forces pushing boards “to demand a very different kind of leadership from senior 
management.”211   
Matters were different with the post-financial crisis switch by banks away from “star” 
CEOs to a more “boring” managerial approach.  Shareholder pressure did help to prompt JP 
Morgan Chase to bolster the independent element on its board of directors.
212
  Nevertheless, 
the shift to a less flamboyant post-financial crisis managerial style by major banks was not 
primarily a market-driven corporate governance trend.  Perhaps this was because bank 
shareholders have reasons to prefer bank executives to be “gung ho”.213  Whatever the reason, 
it was regulatory pressure that prompted banks to retreat from their free-wheeling pre-
financial crisis ways.   
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JP Morgan Chase’s 2013 boardroom reforms were prompted in large part by an effort 
to shore up its relations with regulators,
214
 with the bank being responsive to change because 
it was facing the threat of massive financial penalties for alleged post-financial crisis 
infractions.
215
  Morgan Stanley reoriented itself for similar reasons.  According to a 2013 
report in the Wall Street Journal the firm “upended its culture and ethos…forging a business 
that more closely resembles the banking industry’s old model of eschewing risky bets and 
collecting reliable fees,” with a key change being that “50 full-time government regulators 
(were) now stationed at Morgan Stanley” who were “prowl(ing) the office floor looking for 
land mines….”216  There were no such regulators at Morgan Stanley as late as 2008.217   
Regulatory-driven post-financial crisis overhauls such as Morgan Stanley’s reputedly 
were commonplace in major U.S. financial firms.
218
  This is not surprising given that the 
2010 Dodd-Frank Act vested regulators with various new powers to restrain risk-taking by 
banks that might be too big to fail.
219
  For instance, the legislation provided for the 
establishment of a new Financial Stability Oversight Council that was to have a mandate to 
identify banks that could create a threat to financial stability, to subject such firms to 
enhanced supervision and to impose on such firms, in tandem with the Federal Reserve, fresh 
bank capital requirements and leverage restrictions.
220
  The Federal Reserve, for its part, 
issued in 2012 a supervisory letter providing guidance on its approach to risk-focused 
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supervision of large financial firms that identified corporate governance as one pillar of its 
approach and spelled out various steps boards should take to provide the sort of effective 
corporate governance that would need to be in place for firms to be sustainable under 
economic, operational or legal stresses.
221
   
While the Federal Reserve identified the bolstering of corporate governance as an 
aspect of its supervision of large financial firms, corporate governance reform was not a 
feature of the key bank-specific provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act, namely those focusing on 
bank holding companies (Title VI), non-bank financial companies (Title I, sub-title C), the 
Financial Stability Oversight Council (Title I, sub-title A) and on orderly liquidation of “too 
big to fail” financial companies the Act targeted (Title II).222  The legislation did contain a 
sub-title entitled “Strengthening Corporate Governance” with provisions instructing the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (S.E.C.) to introduce rules requiring companies that 
had failed to split the chief executive officer and chairman of the board roles to explain why 
they had failed to do so and authorizing the S.E.C. to develop a “proxy access” rule 
permitting shareholders with significant stakes to nominate under prescribed circumstances 
directors on a company’s own proxy card.223  These provisions, however, were applicable to 
all issuers falling under the S.E.C’s jurisdiction, not just financial companies.  Moreover, 
most of the provisions in the sub-title of the Dodd-Frank Act dealing with the “hot button” 
                                                          
221
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corporate governance topic of executive compensation
224
 applied to all publicly traded 
companies subject to S.E.C. jurisdiction rather than just financial companies.
225
 
Given the effort made to liberalize proxy access for dissident stockholders and given 
that key executive compensation reforms focused on the introduction of a shareholder “say 
on pay” vote and the mandating of additional disclosure to investors,226 empowering 
shareholders stands out as the pre-dominant theme in the Dodd-Frank Act provisions dealing 
with corporate governance.
227
  Ironically, corporate governance reforms of the sort Dodd-
Frank introduced potentially run counter to the shift toward “boring” banks regulators appear 
to be promoting.  To the extent that the Dodd-Frank Act reforms empower shareholders of 
banks, this enhances their ability to pressure bank executives to pursue high-risk strategies 
that regulators seem to oppose,
228
 particularly because banks’ primary creditors – the 
depositors – have little incentive to impose a check on shareholder-backed risk-taking due to 
deposit insurance the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation provides.
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this paper has been twofold, namely explaining by reference to 
dramatic changes affecting the manner in which U.S. public companies conducted business 
why corporate governance, despite its belated arrival, became much more than a 1970s fad, 
and describing how and why the chronology was altered in a potentially crucial way for 
banks.  Due to deregulation, technological innovation, improved access to finance and to 
companies simply getting bigger, corporate governance began to matter more in U.S. public 
companies as the 20
th
 century drew to a close.  Increased emphasis on boardroom monitoring, 
performance-related executive pay and shareholder activism duly followed.  Shortly 
following major corporate scandals occurring during the early 2000s and the 2002 enactment 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act a new corporate governance equilibrium appeared to coalesce with 
formerly high-flying celebrity CEOs being put on appreciably shorter leashes.   
Similar trends affected the financial services industry, with corporate governance 
achieving a higher profile during an era of “bright new finance” marked by the emergence of 
larger banks, deregulation and technological change.  Due in large measure, however, to 
stock market outperformance leading banks were issued with a mid-2000s corporate 
governance “free pass” that arguably helped to set the stage for the financial crisis.  Only in 
the wake of the 2008-09 economic meltdown U.S. banks arguably helped to precipitate did 
large financial companies shift to “boring” mode and ditch the imperial CEO model 
eschewed generally by U.S. public companies after the corporate governance upheavals of 
the early 2000s. 
A key contribution this paper has made is to pick up on Ronald Gilson’s 1996 cue230 
and examine with respect to corporate governance how and why existing institutions 
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responded to a changing array of challenges.  In so doing, the paper has engaged with issues 
thus far largely unaddressed in the corporate governance literature and thereby provided fresh 
historically-related insights into the development of corporate governance.  The analysis 
provided here is by no means definitive.  For instance, while the paper has indicated that the 
star CEOs who rose to prominence as the 20
th
 century drew to a close had their wings clipped 
post-Enron/SOX with non-financial companies and after the financial crisis with major 
banks, the intriguing question of whether the financial crisis would have been as severe as it 
was if bank executives had not been given a corporate governance free pass in the mid-2000s 
has been left open.   
The paper’s analysis of why celebrity CEOs had their wings clipped when they did is 
also by no means definitive.  We have seen with banks that in the wake of the financial crisis 
regulators eager to reduce risk took the lead.  In contrast, Arthur Levitt, with the “vast 
cultural change” he said was occurring in boardrooms and executive suites of non-financial 
companies in the mid-2000s, attributed the change primarily to pressure from major 
institutional shareholders and the media.
231
  It is unclear whether Levitt’s assessment of the 
potency of market-oriented agents of change is fully on the mark.  For instance, prior to the 
financial crisis passivity in fact was the default option for major institutional stockholders, 
with pension funds and mutual funds being reluctant to do more than vote against 
management proposals which shareholder advisory services opposed.
232
  It is beyond the 
scope of this paper to go further in assessing the contribution of potential agents of change.  
The paper has nevertheless offered fresh insights concerning the inter-relationship between 
corporate governance and the financial crisis and has identified factors that brought corporate 
governance to prominence in banks and public companies more generally, providing in so 
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doing a context within which future historically-oriented research on corporate governance 
can be conducted.   
